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PANEL ONE FORMAT

11/21/2005 10:58 AM

PANEL I: Do Overly Broad Patents
Lead to Restrictions on
Innovation and Competition?
Moderator: John Richards∗
†
Panelists: Matthew Bye
‡
Mary Critharis
§
David Balto
||
Herbert Schwartz
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Dean Treanor.
Our first panel this morning is looking at the question of
whether overly broad patents promote or harm innovation. We
have as our first speaker Mary Critharis from the Patent Office;
then Matthew Bye from the FTC; then two speakers from private
practice, David Balto, who is an antitrust lawyer, and Herb
Schwartz, who is probably the senior performing patent person in
the City nowadays, right Herb?
MR. SCHWARTZ: If you say so, yes.
MR. RICHARDS: I think you probably are.
They will give both sides of this issue.
We just celebrated the centenary of the events at Kitty Hawk,
the first heavier-than-air flight. Had the Wright brothers secured a
patent covering any heavier-than-air machine, which they did
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notif you look at their patents,1 they’re really directed to the nuts
and bolts of the aircraft—then would that have affected the way in
which aeronautic development took place in the first part of the
20th century?
Today, we have a situation in the biotech area, where some
very basic and very broad patents are being granted and both sides
of the question argue very strongly that they are appropriate
because this is the contribution that people have made. They made
a very broad fundamental step forward; and the competition of
course says, “This is stopping us from doing everything; you’re
going to have to pay license fees to everybody; it’s going to make
it prohibitive to make further innovation”and that really, I think,
is where the nub of the question lies.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) had a report come out
approximately a year ago,2 which has caused a lot of debate and
concern and interest, and the Patent Trade Organization (“PTO”)
has started to respond to that.
Our first speaker this morning is Mary Critharis from the PTO.
Ms. Critharis is an attorney with the Office of International
Relations at the US-PTO at the moment. She was previously an
examiner, she is, by training, a chemist, and she will say more
about herself if she wishes to. Thank you.
MS. CRITHARIS: Technical issues.
MR. BALTO: This is the first time, by the way, for everybody
to see that the FTC and PTO do know how to communicate.
MS. CRITHARIS: First, I want to thank the organizers of the
conference, the Journal. This brings back a lot of memories—
some good, some not so goodfrom days of organizing the
symposiums when I was in law school, which was a very long time
ago.
1

See U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906), available at
http://invention.psychology.msstate.edu/i/Wrights/WrightUSPatent/WrightPatent.html
(last visited May 7, 2005).
2
FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N [“FTC”], TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited May
7, 2005).
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I’m going to talk a little bit in this initial presentation about
what the policies and practices are at the US-PTO. I think that will
give us a framework for some of the later discussions.
[Slide] First, I just wanted to explain that we have seven
technology centers and that’s how we are organized.3 Most of the
ones that we will be talking about today will be in the biotech
group; then there’s the chemical group; there’s a computer
groupthat’s Group 2100 where a lot of the business method
patents and the Internet-related patents are examined; there’s a
communication group; there is a hardware-semiconductors group;
and there’s a group on transportation and mechanical engineering. 4
Overall, we have over 3,500 patent examiners.5 To date,
because this is a little old, we have hired some more examiners.
So we have approximately 3,700 examiners.6
[Slide] Each technology center is divided up into different art
units. The art units have a very specific docket where they
examine cases. For example in the biotech art unit you may have a
unit that just does gene therapy patents. So you can see where it’s
very specialized. You may have in the telecommunications art unit
just printers or something of that nature.
In that art unit there are about thirteen to eighteen examiners,
depending on the need for technology, that examine that very
specific area, with a supervisor in that group.
[Slide] Generally, the patent examination process is a backand-forth with the applicant and the examiner. The application is
submitted to the office, and a lot of times there are claims which
define the scope of the invention that are presented with the
application.

3

See Patent Technology Centers, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm (last
visited May 7, 2005).
4
See id.
5
See Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark Office [hereinafter
“USPTO”], Agreement Reached on Patent Telework Program (Jan. 30, 2003), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/03-02.htm.
6
USPTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 12
(Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter “USPTO REPORT”], available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/annual/2004/2004annualreport.pdf.
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Usually what happens is there is a back-and-forth. The
examiner might find some prior art. The applicant may then try to
amend his claims. A lot of times applicants do come in with fairly
broad claims, and then they narrow their scope of protection
because the examiner has found certain references or certain
disclosures that may not make it patentable.7
[Slide] What I’d like to do is discuss some of the patent
examination criteria today.
I just wanted to give you another statistic, the number of
filings. We had over 350,000 filings in fiscal year 2004,8 and that
was 6 percent above fiscal year 2003.9 So we had a little dip
where in 2003 there wasn’t much growth,10 but applications have
been growing on average from 5-to-10 percent over the years, and
we, I think, predict another 5 percent increase in fiscal year 2005.
Of those applications that are filedand this is preliminary
because our fiscal year just ended and so the data is not exactly
accuratebut roughly 170,000 applications are issued.11 But I do
want to point out that even though that looks like a very high
number, this is not just applications that issue from the first
application. A lot of times continuation applications are filed,
divisional applications, continuation part type applications. These
are new applications that are based from old prosecution, of old
cases that have been filed a couple of years ago.
[Slide] The basis for examination and for protection in the
United States comes from the Constitution. Section 8 says:
Congress shall have power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and

7
See USPTO, Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/dcom/bpai/bpaifaq.htm (last visited May 15, 2005).
8
See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
9
See id.
10
See generally U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2003 (showing a
2.6% increase in patent applications between 2002 and 2003), at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified Aug. 31,
2004).
11
See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 (reporting that the actual number was
170,637).
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Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”12
Since 1790, we have always had a patent statute.13 The most
recent amendment to the patent statute, the Patent Act, was in
1952.14
[Slide] These are the statutory requirements that I am going to
talk about today. There are some other ones, but I think these are
the ones that are germane to the discussions that have been set
forth by the FTC in their review, so I think we’ll focus on these.
● There is Section 101, which talks about subject matter, what
is eligible for protection, and also utility.15
● Then there is Section 102, which talks about novelty.16 We
use the word “anticipation” in the patent law. This really means
that something is new.17
● Then there is Section 103, which talks about, even if it’s
new, was it obvious to somebody to have derived that invention.18
[Slide] So the first thing is patentable subject matter. Section
101 grants protection to those inventions that are new and useful.19
They have to be either a process, a machine, a manufacture or
composition of matter, or any improvement thereof. That really is
two different categories: we have processes; and machines,
manufacture, and composition of matter are products. So we have

12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (repealed 1793).
14
Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C. (2000))..
15
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
16
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
17
See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that the
definition of “new” within patent law should be construed in accordance with the
provisions of § 102).
18
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
19
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title”).
13
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process patents and product patents.20 Those are very important
because they offer different types of protection.
Generally, though, this is a very broad statement of what is
eligible for patent protection. A lot of other countries have a lot of
different exclusions in their law.21 We do not have any other
exclusions in our law. Our law sets forth that any new product or
process is eligible for protection.22
That is why Congress has said that anything under the sun
made by the hand of man is eligible for patent protection.23
[Slide] The Supreme Court, though, has articulated three
categories of subject matter that are not patentable.24 These are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.25 These are
things that really do not meet the criteria of invention because
these things were out there all along; nobody really invented
something. These are laws of nature, whether it be gravity, just
some abstract idea, natural phenomena, naturally occurring
products such as a plantyou can’t patent that because it exists;
you didn’t really do anything.
So the key is intervention by man, man actually doing
something with the laws of nature. Applying electricity or taking
something from a plant and processing it, that application may be
patented, but the idea itself, these abstract ideas, are clearly not
patentable.
[Slide] One of the important areas that was briefly touched
upon in the introduction is biotech inventions. For a long time, the
20
See generally id. (stating that an inventor may obtain a patent on “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . .”)
21
See, e.g., Alison Butler, The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights:
What’s at Stake, 72 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., No. 6, 34, 36–37 (1990),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/90/11/Intellectual_Nov_
Dec1990.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005) (differentiating the types of patent exclusions in
industrialized and developing counties by different patentability categories).
22
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
23
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at
5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
24
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
25
See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
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policy of the US-PTO was not to give patents on naturally
occurring products.26 A patent application was filed on a
microorganism, and it went all the way up the Supreme Court, and
the Supreme Court held that this microorganism was not a
naturally occurring microorganism, it was the product of man, and
therefore it could be subject to protection.27
[Slide] Now, on business method patents we used to also have
an exception that business methods were not patentable because
they were just mathematical formulations, bookkeeping methods;
they were really just ideas and mental steps.28 However, the
Federal Circuit in the State Street Bank case29 clearly rejected the
idea that there is a business method rejection. The court went on to
say that all methods should be treated fairly and equally, and as
long as there is a practical application of that ideathat is, a new,
useful, and tangible resultit may be patentable.30 It still has to
meet the other criteria, but we are talking here about whether
something is just eligible for protection. The court said that in this
casethis was a data processing mechanism in a computerit is
definitely patentable subject matter.31
[Slide] So taking our guidance from the Court, we have issued
patents on various biotech inventions and as well on business
method and Internet-related inventions.
[Slide] Now, once something is eligible for protection, it still
has to meet the other criteria of utility, novelty, and obviousness.
I am going to talk briefly about the utility standard, because it
is very important in the biotech area. Even though all of our
requirements are technology-neutral and they apply to all the areas
26

See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306 (stating that the Patent Office rejected
the inventors patent on the grounds that “living things they are not patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” This position was subsequently affirmed by Patent Office
Board of Appeals.).
27
See id. at 320–21.
28
See, e.g., In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165
(C.C.P.A. 1951) (applying the mental steps doctrine, which precludes from patentability,
claims that recite purely mental steps).
29
See State St. Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
30
Id. at 1376.
31
Id.
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of technology, it has specific implications in the biotech area. That
is that utility must be: “specific, credible, and substantial.”32
This is so important in the biotech area because a lot of people
were just finding different sequences or different DNA sequences
or little snippets of nucleotides and they didn’t know what they
were useful for.
With the Human Genome Project33—I know everyone has
heard about thatthere are a lot of sequences in the human
genome. Many elements of the Project do not necessarily have a
function. So you can’t patent something if you don’t know the
specific utility, that the gene has a very particular function. That’s
why the substantial utility and specific utility are very important in
the biotech area.
[Slide] For most other cases, if something has a wellestablished utility, it’s known in the art to be used in a certain
fashion, then that would be acceptable. For example, if something
is useful as a coating or adhesive, that is well accepted and that’s
okay. You don’t have to establish a more specific utility than that.
[Slide] Now I’m going to talk a little bit about novelty. This is
the “newness” requirement in our patent law.34 In order for
somebody to get a patent it must not have been known or used
before. There is a very specific set of criteria about what qualifies
as a printed document or a disclosure. I’m not going to really go
into that because I don’t think that is so relevant to our discussion.
But if somebody did discover this or it was used before, then the
applicant is pretty much barred from getting a patent on that.
[Slide] I think the more relevant requirement here is
obviousness.35 Where are the obviousness standards set? I think
32
See Denise Casey, Gene Patenting Update: U.S. PTO Tightens Requirements, 11
Human Genome News (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ornl.gov/
sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/hgn/v11n1/HGN11No1_2color.pdf
(discussing the new rules used to govern patentability of genomic or other
biotechnological inventions, which were enacted in Dec. 1999).
33
See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Human Genome Project Information, at
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last visited May 8,
2005).
34
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2005) (setting forth the novelty conditions for patentability).
35
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
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it’s pretty clear to people when something is known this is the
same thingthe same application, same processbut when we
talk about obviousness, we are talking about whether somebody of
ordinary skill in the art would have been able to derive this
invention based on what was already known.36
[Slide] This is what examiners look at when they go through
an obviousness determination. They look at the scope and content
of the prior art. The prior art are the references, things like known
patents and printed publications.37 They ascertain the differences
between the new art and the prior art. They have to look at what
the ordinary skill in the art is; that’s very important because you’re
not just talking about the knowledge of a lay person, you’re talking
about somebody skilled in the art. The examiners then consider
the evidence that is presented.
I do want to point out that there is a lot of case law surrounding
obviousness.38 If somebody has a certain widget and someone
makes it a little bigger, the case law says it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to vary the size of certain
components.39 In the computer area, we also have that mere
automation of a known function would have been obvious.40 So
for things like that we have certain standards that we have used in
determining obviousness.
[Slide] I’m going to talk a little bit about post-grant measures
because there’s a lot of criticism about this. You know, we do
issue a lot of patents and sometimes patents get out there that the
examiner missed some prior art.
36

See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
See USPTO, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2142 (8th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter USPTO MANUAL, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
mpep/documents/2100_2142.htm.
38
See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Application and Effect of 35 U.S.C.A. §
103, Requiring Nonobvious Subject Matter, In Determining Validity of Patents, 23
A.L.R. Fed. 326 (2004) (indexing numerous cases and issues surrouding the statutory
requirement of non-obviousness).
39
See generally American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that, among other differences, a mere change in size was
insufficient to distinguish an invention from prior art).
40
See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 228–30 (1976); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
594–95 (1978); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209–220 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); 69 C.J.S. Patents § 81 (2003).
37

PANEL I

956

11/21/2005 10:58 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

They did a thorough search, but it’s very difficult to search
through all the volumes of all the databases and books to
necessarily come up with something.
And in some art, it’s difficult to really do searching. In the
sequence art, sequences can be hundreds of pages long. In the
chemical structure art, the chemical structure can be very
complicated. And in the business method and Internet-related art,
there are not a lot of publications, not organized as well as in the
chemical arts where all structures are published very
systematically.
[Slide] So we do have reexamination proceedings, reissue
proceedings, and we are also considering post-grant opposition
proceedings.
Reexamination is a proceeding where either the patent owner
or a third party can request that the PTO reexamine an application
in light of new art that wasn’t considered by the examiner during
the first go-around.41 So a third party may find a piece of prior art
that demonstrates “this was clearly known; I want the Patent Office
to revisit it.”
There are two kinds of reexamination. There is ex parte and
there is inter partes.
Inter partes is a very new form of reexamination that was
established in 1999.42 It hasn’t been used very much.43 Here the
third party can file a request with the Patent Office and have some
level of participation in the reexamination process. I think the
reason why it hasn’t been utilized is because there are some issues
regarding issue preclusion.
Once the PTO has made a
determination, you are precluded from appealing it in court and
bringing up those issues that you could have raised in the
41

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–303 (2000); see also Association of Patent Law Firms, PTO:
New Guidelines For Previously-Considered Prior Art In Reexamination Proceedings
(June 8, 2003) (discussing recent changes to the Patent Reexamination Guidelines which
allow reliance on “old art”), available at http://www.aplf.org/mailer/issue86.html.
42
USPTO, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION (2004), Executive
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam
Summary, available
report.pdf (last visited May 8, 2005).
43
See USPTO REPORT, supra note 6, at 129, Table 13B (showing that only 27 inter
partes applications were filed in 2004).
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reexamination.44 So I think a lot of third parties are afraid to rely
on it, so we really have had few instances of inter partes
reexamination.
But just to give you an idea, of the 170,000 applications that
we granted, we have roughly, on average, 300-to-400
reexaminations a year.45 So you can see it’s a fairly small number
in comparison to how many applications we see annually.
“Reissue” is only used by the applicant if he wants to change
the scope of the patent.46 He finds a piece of prior art and says, “I
really need narrower protection. I don’t have the right to get such
broad protection.” So he can bring a proceeding with the US-PTO.
Post-grant opposition proceeding is something that we don’t
have now but we are considering. It was recommended in the FTC
report.47 It is something that, again, would have to come in the
statutory form. But we are looking at trying to come up with
different alternatives and different ways to have a really full-blown
opposition proceeding at the PTO. It would likely involve quasidiscovery or some evidentiary level.
There would be a
determination where parties can come in and really bring an action
against the patent on more than just prior art.
[Slide] In closing, I just want to point out some critical things.
The USPTO does not really make the law. We take our
direction on what to patent, what the scope of patentable subject
matter is, from Congress and the courts.48 In doing so, though, we
do try to implement these policies in a way to foster and encourage
investment, innovation, development, and research.
Our patent system is technology-neutral, so the same rules have
to apply across the board. This is part of our international

44

Susan Perng Pan, Considerations for Modifying Inter-Partes Reexam and
Implementing Other Post-Grant Review, 45 IDEA 1, 9 (2004) (noting that estoppel
provisions may ward off inter partes reexaminations).
45
See USPTO REPORT, supra note 42, at 5.
46
35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
47
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8.
48
See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105 (2000) (defining the legislative bounds of
patentable subject matter).
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obligations.49 We are not allowed to treat different areas
differentlyI know people have talked about shorter terms of
protection in the biotech or in the business method area, but that is
something we are precluded from doing.50
We continue to revisit new situations and adapt policy
principles, the principles that have come through Congress, as far
as having broad subject matter protection, as we see new
categories of inventions always coming. We have bioinformatics,
we have nanotechnology coming down the pike, and we are always
trying to incorporate the past principles to new technologies.
Thank you very much.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Mary. That gives us the
background on which to proceed with the rest of this morning’s
discussion.
Our next speaker is Matthew Bye, who is from the Office of
General Counsel of the FTC. He has carried out hearings in the
business method area showing what is appropriate in terms of
patent protection51 and will give us the FTC’s view as to where we
are in that area and what, if anything, needs to be done about it.
MR. BYE: Thank you.
I’m going to talk today about the report that we issued in 2002,
which is on competition and patents.52
Before I go on, I just want to point out that the views I express
today are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Commission or any individual Commissioner.
[Slide] The subject of our report was how to promote
innovation. Innovation is critical to the U.S. economy, critical to

49

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
50
See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.
51
See Transcript, FTC/DOJ Hearings on the Implications of Competition and Patent
Law
and
Policy,
Transcript,
4
(April
11,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020411trans.pdf.
52
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2.
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getting many life-saving and other technologies to people across
the country.
Both patents and competition can provide innovation. They do
it in slightly different ways. What is most important is that the two
policies work together in a proper balance to maximize innovation.
[Slide] What’s also important is that competition and patents
often work well together. The antitrust agencies don’t presume
market power from a patent, and you can see, throughout the
economy, firms compete in the sale of patented goods all the time.
[Slide] So you might ask: What’s the problem? Well, in 2002
we held hearings, and we held them over about thirty days.53 We
had hundreds of panelists, from patent lawyers, patent academics,
business experts, a whole range of representatives from patent law
organizations. Many of them came to us and expressed a concern
about poor-quality patents.
What’s vitally important here is I’m talking about poor-quality
patents that have economic significance. So every now and then
you will see a press article about some sort of amusing patent that
got issued, a peanut butter and jelly sandwich patent or something
like that.54 We are not talking about those because they do not
really have any economic significance at all.
I have some testimony from the AIPLA stating that “large and
small companies are increasingly being subjected to litigation or its
threat on the basis of questionable patents.”55
[Slide] I want to talk quickly about two industries that are
relevant today. But before I go on, I want to mention Chapter

53

See generally FTC/DOJ Hearings to Focus on the Implications of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy (January 30, 2002) (setting forth the initial hearing schedule), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/iphearings.htm.
54
Sara Schaefer Munoz, Patent No. 6004596: Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwich,
WALL ST, J., April 5, 2005, at B1.
55
United States Patent and Trademark Office Fee Modernization Act of 2003: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (statement of Michael K. Kirk,
Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association), available at
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legislative_Action/108th_Congress1/Testi
mony2/Testimony_on_Fee_Legislation.htm.
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Three of our report56, which discusses innovation in a whole range
of industries, looking at pharmaceuticals, biotech, semiconductors,
and computer software.57
We had businesses come in from the pharmaceutical industry
that essentially said that they would not have their industry without
patents and they are a crucial driver of innovation. And then in
other industries, such as software, there was a more mixed view.
Many of the companies said, “We really don’t feel that patents are
a spur to innovation.”
Anyway, in the computer hardware industry, one of the
problems identified by panelists were patent thickets. 58 That’s a
situation where you have so many patents that you have this
unavoidable overlap.59 One statistic we were given is there are
420,000 semiconductor patents held by about 40,000 parties.60 So
whenever you want to try to bring a new product to market, there
can be many complications in terms of identifying all those parties
and obtaining licenses. Then if you bring your product to market
and suddenly someone enforces a patent, you can be liable for
significant damages.
There are a few reasons why we are seeing this patent thicket
develop.
● One is that the technology in this industry is largely
incremental. We don’t often have large, breakthrough innovation.
Each new innovation builds on the next.
● One of the ways that companies have responded to this
problem is to essentially seek as many patents as they possibly
56

See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
See id. at ch. 3, pp. 4, 15, 30, 44.
58
“Patent thicket” is a term attributed to a common problem that occurs when a new
developer seeks to patent a complex invention that incorporates many already-patented
components. In essence, the problem is that the patent applicant must seek cross-licenses
from those who already hold patents to the components. For a discussion of “patent
thickets,” see generally JAMES BESSEN, PATENT THICKETS: STRATEGIC PATENTING OF
COMPLEX TECHNOLOGIES, at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf
(last
visited May 9, 2005).
59
See id.
60
See Transcript, FTC/DOJ Hearings on the Implications of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, Transcript, 667–68 (April 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf.
57
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can,61 so if a company comes to sue them, they can essentially say,
“We’re now going to sue you back with these patents.” So that’s
where we see this concern of the rise of defensive patenting.
Other panelists also suggested that the ease of obtaining patents
at the PTO was contributing to the thicket.
[Slide] As a result, you see extensive portfolio cross-licensing
and defensive patenting throughout the industry.62
Similarly, the software and Internet industry is premised on
incremental innovation.63
Some panelists said there was
uncertainty from the alleged lack of an effective disclosure
requirement.64 They suggested that the source code should
actually be disclosed to the PTO, rather than publishing the idea at
a more abstract level.65
Other panelists have talked about claim construction
difficulties. I just want to note an amicus brief that the PTO,
Justice Department, and FTC recently submitted to the Federal
Circuit on the issue of claim construction,66 essentially looking at
how words in a patent claim should be interpreted, whether they
should use a dictionary or examine the context of the patent and try
to illuminate your interpretation from that.67 The agencies
collectively advocated looking more at the context of the patent
rather than just taking a very literal, sort of dictionary approach.68
61
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 6–7 (describing the
pratice of defensive patenting) .
62
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3, pp. 34–44. Defensive patenting is a practice
in which inventors (normally large firms) obtain patents to discourage infringement suits
by raising patent infringement counterclaims. Id. at ch. 3, p. 36. Cross-licensing is used
to resolve this impasse whereby the potential infringers agree to license their respective
technology to the other. Id. at ch. 2, p. 30.
63
See id. at ch. 3, p. 30.
64
See id. at ch. 3, p. 53.
65
See id. at ch. 3, p. 49.
66
Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, United States Patent and Trade Mark Office
et al., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 375 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1269) (order
granting rehearing en banc), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/sol/ambriefs/Phillips_03-1269.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005).
67
Id. at 2.
68
Id. at 9–15 (arguing that the claim construction should primarily consider intrinsic
evidence rather than rely solely on standard dictionary definitions); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae United States Patent and Trade Mark Office et al.,

PANEL I

962

11/21/2005 10:58 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

Patent thickets are a problem in software, as is defensive
patenting. Companies are seeking patents to use as bargaining
chips, and it can increase the cost of entry. One of the companies
essentially came to us and said that it’s allocating funds to people
obtaining patents rather than spending money on research, simply
so he can defend the company. He estimated that he took about 25
percent away from his research budget to increase the number of
patent filings. This was done, he said, with no benefit to
innovation.69
[Slide] So clearly questionable patents are part of the problem.
What are they? Well, they are patents that are likely invalid or
overbroad.
A critical thing to note here is that, on the whole, the patent
examiners at the PTO do a superb job. As Mary mentioned, they
are flooded with nearly 1,000 patents a day. They have roughly
eight-to-twenty-five hours to read an application, investigate prior
art, correspond with the parties, and ultimately make a decision.
Some of these applications can include thousands and thousands of
pages. So in the time they are given they do a very superb job.
But, inevitably, you have questionable patents trickling
through. These harm innovation and competition in a number of
ways.70
The best thing to think about is the situation where you have a
small biotech company that wants to do research in an area and
they see a questionable patent that stands in the way. They have a
few choices:
● They can simply avoid the area, just not engage in any
research, and then the economy loses because we are not getting
R&D that we would otherwise have had.71
Phillips v. AWH Corp., __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). (largely
adopting the view for which the Agencies advocated) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/ambriefs/Phillips_03-1269.pdf.
69
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 2, pp. 30–31 (discussing how to promote
innovation through the balancing of competition with patent law and policy).
70
See id. at Executive Summary, p. 8.
71
See Symposium, Patent Rights and Licensing, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 3, para. 52
(2000) (“There is empirical evidence that the smaller start-ups with less financial
resources direct their research in such a way that they avoid fields crowded with many
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● They could go to the company and seek a license, but then
they are paying for something that really they should not be paying
for, so you have funds being diverted from R&D.
● They can’t challenge the validity of the patent unless they
have been threatened with infringement.
So it can be very difficult for some of these companies,
particularly when they are small, to navigate around some
questionable patents.
[Slide] What are the solutions for this? Well, as a theoretical
solution, we have the “but for” test. I can’t emphasize enough that
this is a theoretical solution. It is not one that is meant to apply to
specific cases.
Patents have a cost as a means of fostering innovation, but so
do other mechanisms. If you think of trade secrecy, when
companies use trade secrecy they don’t disclose, and so other
companies lose out from the very important patent disclosures that
we get.
The “but for” test essentially involves asking: would the
innovation occur absent the patent? If it would occur, then it is
better off being spurred by competition and that patent essentially
is unnecessary.72
[Slide] Practical approaches. In our report we make ten
recommendations and I also point out the National Academy of
Sciences released a report earlier this year, “A Patent System for
the 21st Century.”73 It’s available on-line, as is our report. It
makes six key recommendations, some of which overlap with
ours.74
[Slide] Our first recommendation, as Mary mentioned, was to
establish a PTO administrative procedure for challenging patents,
patents . . .”); see also S. Benjamin Pleune, Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the
PTO to Properly Evolve with Novel Technologies, 2001 U.ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 365,
367–68 (discussing the effects of broad patent protection on genetic research) (2001).
72
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, pp. 10–11.
73
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L. ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS Report], available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005).
74
Compare id. at 81 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–15.
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essentially to weed out some of these invalid and overbroad patents
we are seeing.75
Litigation is very expensive and very time-consuming. Some
biotech companies estimated it can cost between $3 million and $5
million and take a number of years.76
NAS makes a recommendation on this same topic,77 and quite
recently Representatives Berman and Boucher introduced a bill
into the House which attempts to outline or describe what such a
system would look like.78
[Slide] There are a few basic requirements for this sort of
system: It has to address important issues of patentability. They
have to control costs, prevent patent holders from being abused by
frivolous suits, and keep it timely.79 How do you juggle all these
things? Well, that is really the catch. The devil is in the details
and it is something that needs to be worked out.
I will just give one example here. We co-sponsored a
conference in April in Berkeley.80 The question was raised, how
long after a patent is issued could you seek reexamination? The
people from biotech companies said, “We think nine months is a
good amount of time,” because they feel that they can identify a
problematic patent quite quickly, and they want certainty most of
all. On the other hand, people from the semiconductor industry
said, “The patents we have a problem with tend to take three-tofour years to surface, often after we have issued products, and so
we need a much longer timeframe.” It’s just one example of some
of the difficulties we face in implementing this type of review.
[Slide] Moving on to our sixth recommendation: consider
possible harm to competition along with other possible benefits
and costs before extending the scope of patentable subject matter.81

75

See FTC, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8.
See id. at Executive Summary, 8.
77
See NAS Report, supra note 73, at 82.
78
H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004).
79
See FTC, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 7–8.
80
See Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/patentreform (last visited May 16, 2005).
81
Id. at Executive Summary, 14.
76
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Over the last two decades, we have seen patentable subject
matter expand. We have seen patents issued on biotech and
software and business method patents. This is essentially very
similar to the “but for” test.82 However, before patentable subject
matter is extended, we want to look at whether we really need
patents in the particular area or whether the innovation will occur
regardless.
[Slide] There are a few issues with this. As Mary mentioned,
there is the Supreme Court precedent, “anything under the sun that
is made by man is patentable.”83 There are obviously questions at
the margins here, but that’s one factor to consider.
Another one is where and when such a debate should take
place. The PTO often receives patent applications on new
technologies. They sort of trickle in and they might increase over
time. It’s not often that a bright light goes on and says “this is now
patentable,” so there is not always a clear point in time to have this
debate. And also, when we do have such a debate, we need to
have enough information to ask the “but for”84 question: what
would happen if we didn’t issue patents on this area?
[Slide] Moving on to our tenth recommendation, which is to
expand consideration of economic learning and competition policy
concerns in patent law decision-making.85 This idea is not
something that we intend to be applied by the individual examiner
in the PTO. It’s more in the formation of rules, something that the
courts could consider and that the PTO could consider when they
are issuing guidelines. It’s also something for Congress to
consider. It is important to consider because we need to ensure
that competition is not unnecessarily displaced.

82

See id. at ch. 4, pp. 6–8. The “but for” test is an alternative analysis of patentability
that considers the competitive effects of the patent. Rather than inquiring into whether
the statutory requirements are met, the test asks whether the the innovation would have
occurred as soon as it did in the absence of patent rights. Id.
83
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
84
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 4, pp. 6–8 (stating that the “but for” test cannot
practically be applied in the cases of individual patents given the availability and costs of
the necessary information, but may be applicable in establishing general policies).
85
See id. at Executive Summary, 17.
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[Slide] There is a lot going on in the area of patent law reform
at the moment. Coming up next year, the NAS, AIPLA, and FTC
will co-sponsor a series of town meetings to discuss patent reform
in four cities across the country.86 They will essentially involve
someone making a presentation about a particular area, followed
by a back-and-forth discussion with the audience—so stay tuned
for that.
Then, also look for the bill that was recently introduced.87 It
will be reintroduced in the next congressional session.88
Our report, as I mentioned, is available on-line.89 Otherwise, if
you would like to give me your card or email address, I’ll happily
send it to you.
Thanks for your time.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Matthew.
Our next speaker will be David Balto to take it from the
antitrust perspectiveat least that’s what his background is. I
don’t know if he is going to speak purely on antitrust, on how the
need for competition impinges on what we should be doing in the
patent system.
MR. BALTO: Just so all of you know, I am in an adversarial
position. I get to wear this [Red Sox baseball cap]. Somebody at
the airport said to me, “Wait till next year.” I said back to him,
“I’ve been saying that for the last eighty-five years.”
I want to thank the people who put this program together. I
know how hard they worked at it. And I know from reading past
issues of the Journal what a terrific journal it is, and I can only say
that I am disappointed that I am not on the Janet Jackson panel.

86

See Agenda for Town Meeting of Patent Reform, at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/
workshops/patenttownmeetings/townmeetingsagenda.pdf (providing schedules for each
of the Town Meetings) (last visited May 9, 2005).
87
H.R. 5299, 108th Cong. (2004).
88
As of April 17, 2005, the legislation was embodied in a discussion draft being
circulated among the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property. A copy of the draft
is available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/DraftPatentStatuteDDC.pdf (last
visited May 16, 2005).
89
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2.
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I wanted to say at the outset I am requiredjust how Matt has
to give a disclaimerto give an advertisement for my law firm
whenever I speak. We’re a terrific law firm. We were named IP
Litigation Firm of the Year last year.90
I am here to tell you that antitrust and IP are at odds.
Regardless of what any of these people tell you about how they
serve similar masters and seek similar goals, these things are at
odds. I am here to tell you that the scales are not balanced at this
time.
Imagine a house that is broken-down and threadbare, lost and
ignored, and in the backyard there is a big, weedy thicket. Well,
the FTC report sort of suggests what you might do with parts of the
thicket, to trim it down, but there are a lot of things running amok
in the house at the same time.91
The pinnacle, to me, of how companies thought that IP rights
gave then unfettered ability to abuse the antitrust laws was a point
that Microsoft made in their litigation against the Department of
Justice.92 They suggested that their tying arrangements were
justified, and in fact, immune from antitrust scrutiny because they
had a copyright over Internet Explorer.93
How did the conservative en banc D.C. Circuit respond to this?
It held, “Microsoft’s primary copyright argument borders on the
frivolous. The company claims an absolute and unfettered right to
use its intellectual property as it wishes.”94 It also quoted the
Microsoft brief: “If intellectual property rights have been lawfully
acquired, their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust
liability.”95

90
See Firm News, The American Lawyer and IP Law & Business Names Robins,
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P. “IP Litigation Department of the Year”, at
http://rkmc.com/firm_news.asp?newsId=185 (last visited May 16, 2005).
91
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 10–20 (setting forth
recommendations designed to, among other goals, reduce the preclusive effect of patent
thickets).
92
U.S. v. Microsoft Co. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93
Id. at 63.
94
Id.
95
Id. (quoting Appellant’s Opening Br. at 105 (Nos. 00-5212 and 00-5213).
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Let me tell you, if that was true, in a couple years none of you
would ever have to take an antitrust course. Fortunately, it is not
true. As the D.C. Circuit said: “That is no more correct than the
proposition that the use of one’s personal property, such as a
baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”96
As the Federal Circuit succinctly stated: “Intellectual property
rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”97
Now, what Matt didn’t tell you is that there are two parts to this
story. That’s sort of like the way that Red Sox fans always
feelyou know, there’s the first part and then there’s the second
part that never comes. But there are two parts to this story.
The first part was the wonderful report that he has talked about.
The executive summary is in your materials.
But there is a second report. It has not been issued. Every
morning we energetic antitrust people, who know that antitrust
stands there as the vanguard to protect you from the abuse of
intellectual property rights, wake up, run to our computers, check
the FTC website, and go, “Where is that report, the second report,
which deals with how do the antitrust laws need to be reformed,
how do the antitrust laws need to be enforced, to protect against
that problem that Matthew has described?” But look as we might,
we can’t seem to find that report.
But if we really want to do more than just take care of the
weeds in the backyard, we need to see what kinds of actions can be
taken by antitrust enforcers to set appropriate limits on intellectual
property rights.
You know, the law is clear in this area: you have a right as a
patent holder to exercise your patent monopoly, but you don’t have
a right to go beyond that patent monopoly and abuse the antitrust
laws.
All of you who have taken patent law know that there is a
doctrine known as inequitable conduct,98 that if you engage in
96

Id.
Id. (quoting In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000)).
98
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
1049 (2d ed. 1998).
97
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patent misuse,99 if you defraud the Patent Officeand we now
obviously know there is ample opportunity for thatif you engage
in some type of inequitable conduct, your patent may be declared
invalid.100 But such actions also can be attacked under the antitrust
laws.
So what I wanted to do is just give you some examples of
enforcement actions taken by the FTC involving efforts by patent
owners to get a little bit more out of their patent than they really
were supposed tothese people abused the patent system or other
regulatory systems. These examples demonstrate why we need,
not only reform of the patent system, but aggressive antitrust
enforcement. That is the second volume of the report, Matt, if I
haven’t mentioned that already: to properly reset the balance
between IP and antitrust law.
Many of these enforcement actions, by the way, involve the
pharmaceutical industry.101 Years ago when I was a young
attorney at the Federal Trade Commission, we were doing
investigations of a drug company. They had such a fragile
understanding of the antitrust laws and of their obligations under
the those laws, and they were rather brazen in their internal
documents in describing the types of anticompetitive conduct that
they planned to engage in than other types of firms.
The documents were striking. You would never find them in a
well counseled company.
One of these documents we came up with was this nine-step
plan by four branded pharmaceutical companies. It outlined efforts
that they could take to go and expand and protect their patents, or
protect their monopoly after their patents expired.
So what were a couple of these strategies that led to important
FTC enforcement actions?

99
See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1980); see
also CHISUM, supra note 98 at 1066.
100
See CHISUM, supra note 98, at 1049.
101
See FTC, FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS
(Oct. 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0410rxupdate.pdf (listing numerous
enforcement actions brought by the FTC against pharmaceutical firms).
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The first one was deceptive patent filings and filings before the
Food and Drug Administration.102 The Hatch-Waxman Act103 sets
this incredibly complicated gauntlet for generic firms to effectively
enter into the market. Basically, this gauntlet provides for
litigation between branded firms and generic.104
Anyway, one of the things that you have to do when you are a
branded firm is list your patent in an FDA book called the Orange
Book.105 Bristol-Myers came up with the strategy that, at the point
that the patent would expire, they would return to the Patent
Office, the very busy Patent Office, and say, “Here’s this patent
application. Please approve it. We need it right away.”106 And the
Patent Office, of course, looking very diligently and very carefully
at the application, would automatically approve it. The FDA
would then automatically list the patent in the Orange Book. That
prevented generic firms from being able to enter the market
because of statutory requirements that said if a patent was listed in
the Orange Book, you couldn’t enter for an additional thirty
months.107

102

See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: A
Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. 36–38 (2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission describing how some pharmaceutical companies have abused the parameters
of the Hatch-Waxman Act to secure greater profits), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-140.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005).
103
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271, 282 (2000)). The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 is commonly known as The Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act
encourages generics to enter the market by providing the following benefits to generic
manufacturers: (1) the filing of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA); (2) the
right to test the generic version of a drug before the expiration of the brand name patent;
and (3) receipt of 180 days of exclusivity for being the first generic on the market. Id. §§
101, 202.
104
See id.
105
Electronic Orange Book of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited May 9, 2005).
106
See, e.g., Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Why You Still Can’t Buy Cheaper Generics,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at F2. The BuSpar patent was a day from expiring when the
FDA issued the new patent to Bristol-Myers. See id.
107
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
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Bristol-Myers figured out a perfect way to game this strategy,
and so they did, until one day the FTC, the states, and lots of
private attorneys brought antitrust actions against them.108
Ultimately, Bristol-Myers settled the case, paying substantial
damages.109
So that’s the first thing: Is there some way we can go and
manipulate the patent and regulatory system to extend a patent life
that actually is supposed to end?
Second strategy: Well, let’s say you really can’t get the
regulators involved and you don’t really feel like defrauding the
Patent Office. What you can do is find other ways of abusing the
regulatory structure.
Now, there is this aspect of the regulatory structure that says
that the first generic to file a challenge to a patent has the exclusive
right to enter the market for six months.
The brand-name firms recognized, “why don’t we just enter
into a deal with that first generic firm and we’ll settle our patent
litigation; we will just agree that they won’t enter the market and
we will pay them, and that is what our settlement will be.”110
Now, all of you who are students know that you settle patent
litigation and typically what happens is that the alleged infringer
pays the patent holder because that’s the way things should work,
because maybe the alleged infringer really doesn’t have a right to
enter the market. But the way these arrangements worked, the
patent holder paid the alleged infringer; the brand-name firm paid
the generic firm.111
The FTC saw this as a guise for two firms going in, splitting
monopoly profits, and creating a new barrier to entry and

108

See Melody Peterson, Bristol-Myers Held Culpable in Patent Move Against Rivals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at C1; see also In re Buspirone Patent and Antitrust Litig.,
185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
109
See Melody Peterson, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay $670 million to Settle Numerous
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C9.
110
See, e.g., In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. at 366 (alleging that Bristol Meyers Squibb’s
settlement with Schein Pharmaceuticals was a pretense whereby Bristol Meyers paid
Schein to keep a generic version of Buspirone off the market).
111
See id.
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effectively extending the patent life.112 You know, the patent
would have ended at some point, but by going and entering into
this arrangement they were able to abuse the patent rights and
effectively extend their patent.
So let me just leave it with those two examples because I want
to hear from Herb, who is a lifelong Yankees fan, and I’m sure will
not agree with any of my points.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, David.
Herb Schwartz, a partner at Fish and Neave, as I said, the
premier patent lawyer in the City these days.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Good morning. Actually, I happen to be a
Brooklyn Dodgers fan. I grew up in the shadow of Ebbets Field. I
must admit when the Dodgers were moved out of Brooklyn by
Walter O’Malley, I decided baseball was a business. I felt robbed,
cheated, and raped, and really, sort of my interest in baseball was
never quite the same. My wife happens to be a Red Sox fan, and I
just go to sleep when these games go on now. But hopefully
they’ll bring the Dodgers back to Brooklyn someday and I can
really reassert my interest in the whole thing. So as far as baseball,
those are my views.
As far as the FTC report and the subject of today, I have
trouble with the basic thesis that the FTC uses. I don’t think it
makes any sense. Let me explain what I mean.
The basic thesis of the FTC is that there is something called a
questionable patent.113 They say that a questionable patent is a
patent that is “[a] poor quality or questionable patent”114 and it is
either “likely invalid or contains claims that are likely
overbroad.”115
Now, I’ve spent a fair amount of time involved in patent
litigation and teaching patent law and I know a little bit about the
statutes, and you have heard about them this morning. There are
provisions in the patent laws for novelty, usefulness,
112
113
114
115

See Peterson, supra note 108, at C1, C19.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 9.
Id. at Executive Summary, 5.
Id.
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unobviousness.116 I have never seen a provision that deals with a
questionable patent; I have never seen a provision that deals with
an overly broad patent; I have never seen a provision that deals
with an incremental invention.
To me, fundamentally, this is pejorative rhetoric without any
analytical basis. What it is really, is an attempt by an agency
fundamentally charged with antitrust enforcement to use rhetoric
rather than logic to try to take on the patent system. And so I am
really troubled by that.
Then, when you get into the detail of it, you look in their
report, starting at page five. They talk about what they call
questionable patents deterring or raising the cost of innovation and
talk about incremental innovation.117 I don’t really see any serious
support for those propositions.
What they rely on are anecdotes from people in industry.
When you look at the anecdotes, to me they don’t really stand up.
There is an anecdotal statement of 90,000 patents generally related
to microprocessors that are held by 10,000 people118 That’s
attributed to Peter Detkin, who was the Patent Counsel of Intel119.
Intel certainly didn’t operate that way. Intel had a few core patents
and they kept everybody else out of the field.120 They weren’t
worried about 90,000 patents.
When I represented a company called Digital, and we sued
Intel on ten patents that related to their core microprocessor, they
didn’t have any trouble figuring out what those were. They settled
very quickly.
There really aren’t 90,000 patents that make a difference.
There are only a handful, and people in business know who they
are and what they are. So I just think ultimately, that’s just empty
rhetoric.

116

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2000).
Id. at Executive Summary, 5–6.
118
Id. at Executive Summary, 6.
119
Id. at Executive Summary, 6 n.19.
120
See Press Release, FTC: Intel Abuses its Monopoly Power in Violation of Federal
Law (June 8, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/06/intelc.htm.
117
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The other talk about patent thickets and questionable patents
really misses the fundamental point. There are reasons to try to
deal with patents that don’t stand up. To me the fundamental
problem with the patent system, which I do agree with the FTC on,
is there needs to be some way to challenge patents on the
conventional theories of invalidity without getting involved in a
full-blown infringement suit.
Under the current law, the only way you can challenge a patent
is to bring a declaratory judgment suit, which means you have to
be threatened by infringement.121 As a practical matter, that
doesn’t really do any good in most industries because there are
patents out there and you may never be threatened with a suit on
them.
I think most responsible organizationsthe FTC being among
them, and also the National Science Foundation, and the various
patent law groupshave realized that the time has come for some
system in which there needs to be an administrative challenge of
patents early on so that people can get rid of, or deal with, patents
that are invalid.122
But that doesn’t mean that the system is full of “questionable”
patents or “overly broad” patents or the like.123 It means that our
system has a hole in it, the hole being the ability to deal with those
few patents that right now cannot be addressed because the only
remedy is to wait until there is a full-blown infringement suit. So I
think that is one significant issue that needs to be dealt with.
I think the other significant issue that needs to be dealt with,
which is talked about, is the continuation practice in the patent
world.124 The continuation practice is something that is really a
121

See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3, p. 22 (discussing the difficulty in
challenging a patent outside of an action for infringement and the limited availability of
declaratory judgment actions).
122
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 7–8 (recommending the
enactment of “legislation to create a new administrative procedure to allow post-grant
review of and opposition to patents”).
123
But see id. at Executive Summary, 5–6 (describing a pervasive problem of
questionable patents that harm innovation and competition).
124
A continuation is an application that essentially restarts the examination process. It
may be filed by applicant anytime prior to the patent being either issued or abandoned.
See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberley L. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
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creature of the last twenty years in the sense that, prior to the
Federal Circuit, you could not continually write claims to cover
new contributions as you saw them being made.125 You were
really stuck more with what was in your original patent
application. The Federal Circuit has changed that rule.126
There has always been the ability to file a continuation
application;127 there is nothing new about that. What is new is the
ability to write claims in continuation applications, drafted
specifically to cover contributions done after the patent application
was filed and not really tell the Patent Office you’re doing it. You
don’t tell the PTO that you are writing these new claims to cover
newly developed things. What you do is you change the words
around and suggest it was always part of your invention.128
I find that to be a very troublesome practice and a practice that
has spawned a lot of litigationmaybe not unnecessary litigation,
but certainly expensive litigationand there needs to be a cure to
that.
One cure to that, which exists in other countries, is something
called prior user rights, which is something that has been enacted
B.U. L. REV. 63, 66–69 (2004) It is often used where the applicant is dissatisfied with
the Patent Office’s decision or the narrow scope of the patent’s claims. Id.
125
See Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Sayles, 97 U.S. 554, 555
The law does not permit enlargements of an original specification any more
than it does where letters-patent already granted are reissued. It regards with
jealousy and disfavor any attempt to enlarge the scope of an application once
filed, or of letters-patent once granted, the effect of which would be to enable
the patentee to appropriate other inventions made prior to such alteration, or
improvements which have gone into public.
Id.
126
See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)
It should be made clear at the outset of the present discussion that there is
nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the
purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor’s product from the
market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to
cover a competitor’s product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during
the prosecution of a patent application.
Id.
127
See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b) (2005).
128
See Lemley &. Moore, supra note 124 , at 76–79 (2004) (discussing problems arising
from allowing claims to be rewritten in continuation applications to track competitors
products).
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in a very limited fashion in this country and probably ought to be
more broadly enacted.129 Beyond that, I think there probably
should be tighter restrictions on the continuation practice so that it
doesn’t become as much of a game of patent applications, filing a
series of five or ten continuation applications.
Some of this problem has been cured with the change of the
patent statute to allow a patent to be valid for twenty years from
filing instead of seventeen years from issuance.130 So I think that a
piece of this problem has been cured by the twenty-year term, and
I think a further piece of it could be cured by changing the
continuation practice.
I think the other recommendation of the FTC, and also the
National Science Foundation, that I agree with, is that there is a
need to beef up the Patent and Trademark Office. More money
must be spent on the Patent and Trademark Office to keep up with
the increased number of applications and the increased
technology.131
What I don’t agree with is when you take the FTC’s premise of
questionable patents, their cure is to tinker with the enforcement of
patents by adding essentially ad hoc remedies to devalue patents
and devalue the patent system.132 What I mean by ad hoc remedies
are things like changing the burden of proof on invalidity from
clear and convincing evidence to a mere preponderance of the
evidence; changing the judicial standards on obviousness to
something that would be much tougher to support the validity of
the patent.133 I think those changes are unwarranted and uncalled
for and have no analytical basis and I would be opposed to them.
Thank you.

129

See Symposium, Fourth Biennial Patent System, Major Problems Conference, Prior
Use Rights: Introductory Comments, 34 IDEA 117, 118-20 (1994) (statements by Slyvie
A. Strobel comparing European approach to prior user rights to the U. S. approach).
130
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
131
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 12; NAS REPORT, supra note
73, at 82.
132
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 8–10.
133
See id.
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MR. RICHARDS: I’ll start with you, Matthew. Would you
care to make any comments on anything that has been said since
you spoke?
MR. BYE: First thing, questionable patents.134 It’s not empty
rhetoric. It is a term that has been used by a number of the leading
patent law organizations. It is a term that is used by many
businesses that come and testify to us. So it’s an established term
that has been used throughout the industry.
In terms of support for our recommendations in this report, we
have support at many different levels. There is anecdotal support,
but as is said, one person’s anecdotes are another person’s case
study. When you have all the leading businesses in many
industries come and testify, and if they testify with a common
theme, then there is something you can extract out of that.135
We also rolled out a number of empirical studies that have
looked at various aspects of the patent system and the ability of
patents to spur innovation done over a number of years. They are
the two main bases.
But I guess the thing I want to point out is we had companies
like Microsoft and Intel and Cisco and Google and Symantec come
to us, as well as pharmaceutical companies and biotech companies.
Particularly, companies in the semiconductor industry and in
software said, “There are problems with the patent system, it is
harming our ability to innovate, it is harming our ability to bring
new products to the market.”136
The patent system essentially exists to promote innovation.137
It is to help these companies do what they want to do. If they are
coming and telling us there is a problem, well maybe that is
something that is genuinely worth listening to.
I just want to make one final point about the FTC’s role. The
FTC is an antitrust enforcer.
We scrutinize all sorts of
anticompetitive conduct. We also have a role as a competition
134

See id. at 6 (discussing the filing of “questionable” patents; patents with no
innovative value filed as a defensive mechanism).
135
See generally id. at ch. 3 (discussing specific issues raised by industry panelists).
136
See id. at Executive Summary, 5 n.16.
137
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

PANEL I

978

11/21/2005 10:58 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

advocate. We often do studies for various industries or look at an
intersection of different issues. A few years ago we looked at the
Hatch-Waxman Act;138 we’ve looked at the patent system;139
we’ve looked at the health care industry and released a report
about that earlier this year.140
Our job is essentially to look at roadblocks to competition–
whether they are regulatory or business conduct–and try to suggest
reform to them. Doing this report is really at the very heart of our
mission.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
Mary?
MS. CRITHARIS: First, to address Matthew’s concern, when
you are talking about questionable patents, are you talking about
patents that you don’t feel should have been issued? Is it because
the law was too broad or because the PTO didn’t do a good job?
I think it is important to at least distinguish between patents
that maybe weren’t examined properly, that were erroneously
issued, and patents that you just feel are too broad because there
shouldn’t be a patent on a particular gene sequence or a patent on a
particular software or way of doing business over the Internet.
Denial of patents in this second category is based on statute.141
The distinction is whether there is a concern that the USPTO is not
doing a good job of examining the patent applications according to
the law, or whether the law, as drafted by Congress, interpreted by
the courts, and applied by the USPTO needs to be revisited.
So I think I want to make at least that distinction first. That’s
for any of the panel members as well.
QUESTION: In terms of questionable patents
MR. RICHARDS: Can you please say who you are for the
record?
138
See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (July
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
139
See generally FTC, supra note 2.
140
See FTC, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (July 2004), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
141
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (defining the statutory limits of a patent).
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QUESTION: [Inaudible] Maritzi, with Jones, Day.
In terms of questionable patents, clients that we deal with and
companies that are out there–in particular the pharmaceutical
companies–tend to coin that phrase for patents that are used against
them, but when they get them themselves, they are fine and
wonderful.
MS. CRITHARIS: That was the other thing.
QUESTIONER: So I really have an issue with this category of
questionable patents.
I think we can probably do a better job of enforcement. In
Europe, for example, they have research use exceptions, where it is
not an act of infringement if you are tinkering with the invention
for a noncommercial purpose.142 In this country, we have created
an exemption for actual commercial infringement with the HatchWaxman Act,143 but the research to get there is not exempt. So if
you really want to spur innovation, probably the way to do it
would be to make pure research free of infringement, but
commercial activities actionable.
I don’t know what the panel thinks about that.
MR. RICHARDS: I would just make a comment on that
because I did a paper at this year’s Fordham Conference on that
particular topic.144
The situation in Europe isn’t quite as you paint it because
we’ve got some German Supreme Court decisions which say you
cannot distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
experimental use nowadays, which means that they are finding
difficulty.145 The idea that people should be able to do research
142

See, e.g., Kilinische Versuche II, [1998] R.P.C. 423, 431-33 (German Supreme Court
1998) “[A]ll experimental activities which relate to the object of the invention should be
exempted. This exemption should be granted regardless of any additional motivations
that might be taken up and to which purposes the obtained results will ultimately be
determined to serve.” See id.
143
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2005).
144
See generally Fordham University School of Law Thirteenth Annual Conference
onInternational
Intellectual
Property
Law
and
Policy,
at
http://www.fordhamipconference.com/ (last visited May 16, 2005).
145
Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of
the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 264 (2003).
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and they shouldn’t infringe a patent is appealing on its face. What
I argued in the paper that I gave in the spring was that we need
some sort of fair use exception in patent law, similar to that which
exists in copyright law.146 But I think it is a horribly difficult
balancing test to try and work out exactly where that fair use
boundary line should come out.
That is obviously one element of where the patent system may
be harming innovation, but it is not the essence of what we are
talking about today, which is whether overly broad patents harm
innovation.
QUESTIONER: According to Article I, Section 8, inventors
are supposed to be rewarded for their works. The system we have
now is, if you have a Nobel Prize-winning invention, it may not
become commercially important until more than twenty years after
the expiration of the patent.147 So we really have a system that
does not serve the commercial needs or the goals of Article I,
Section 8.148
MR. RICHARDS: Other countries, in the past, have had
provisions for extending patents where there has not been adequate
remuneration during the normal life of the patent.149 They have all
given them up because they found bigger problems with them than
having a system such as we have.
QUESTIONER: Isn’t it easier just to come up with some termof-years after granting the patent? That kind of takes care of the
problem.
MR. RICHARDS: No, because that enables you to artificially
delay the grant of your patent, which is what used to happen here.
I don’t think you finished. If you want to finish your remarks,
then we’ll move on to the audience.
146

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2005) (the term of a patent is 20 years).
148
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
149
See, e.g., Review of the Patents Act 1953: The Pharmaceutical Patent Term in New
Zealand: Discussion Paper–Patent Term for Pharmaceuticals, at http://www.med.
govt.nz/buslt/int_prop/pharmaceutical/discussion/discussion-03.html (noting that prior to
1994, New Zealand’s patent law maintained a term of sixteen years with a possible
extension of ten years if they can prove inadequate remuneration) (last visited May 15,
2005).
147

PANEL I

2005]

11/21/2005 10:58 AM

OVERLY BROAD PATENTS LEAD TO RESTRICTIONS

981

MS. CRITHARIS: I have some other ones, but I thought that
we would handle them as they come. That’s why I asked the
question about where the real concern lies. Is it the patent law, as
far as accommodating a broad spectrum of technologies, or is it the
way the Patent Office is perhaps issuing patents that they don’t feel
were properly examined.150 I think that is a key distinction.
MR. RICHARDS: I agree with you. I don’t think it’s an “or,” I
think it’s an “and,” because I think both are really happening.
I think the Patent Office does a very good job, but some stuff
does get through, inevitably, and probably we need, as Herb has
said and as the FTC says, some better way of dealing with that.
But that is not the totality of the issue. The other issue is
whether the law itself permits patents which are overly broad, or
patents which might harm innovation, because they prevent people
from doing research which would otherwise lead to other
innovation.
The second half of that, I think, is outside our topic this
morning and there are some other issues similar to that which
might ultimately lead to the need to amend the patent law.
The question of whether the law permits overly broad patents,
even if properly examined, is something which the Federal Circuit
of course has been wrestling with in its desperate attempts to work
out what the “written description requirement” means over the last
several years.151 Two years ago, when Herb and I were on a
similar panel, I tried to get Herb to say something about the written
description requirement and he declined. I don’t know if he is
going to decline this morning.
MR. SCHWARTZ: About written description?
MR. RICHARDS: Yes.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I’ve been litigating both sides of it for
companies. I guess the only thing I would say about written
150

See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 8–9 (discussing how the
USPTO’s limited resources curb its ability to properly examine patents).
151
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–69 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (discussing what constitutes an adequate written description).
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description is I believe that there is a statutory requirement for both
written description and enablement, and I think both of then have
to be there.152 I think that the written description and enablement
should be interpreted in a way that they don’t go so far as to pick
up after-occurring developments. Namely, it seems to me that if
you are going to sweep something into a patent that you did five
years later, it ought to be both described and enabled by the
original application. That’s my basic view on written description
and enablement.
MR. RICHARDS: We are all sort of grappling with this sort of
horror as to how broadly a patent should be allowed to be based on
the original disclosure, or the original contribution to technology.
There was a time when the UK had a provision in its statute
that a patent could be invalidated on the ground it was not “fairly
based.”153 That’s all it said in the statute.154 The courts basically
interpreted that as saying that you should not be entitled to a scope
of protection which went beyond what could soundly be predicted
based on the core content of the disclosure.155 That, I think, is still
the law in Australia and India and a few places.156 It is gone in the
UK with the Europeanization of UK law.157
I have sometimes wondered whether that might be useful, but
that again had its problems in its application. It is a difficult issue.
Do you want to say more?
MS. CRITHARIS: I do have a few other comments.
I think it was pointed out that companies have come forward to
the FTC saying that the patent system is preventing them from
entering the market. That is a fact. The patent system does do
152

See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2005).
Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87, § 5 (Eng.).
154
Id.
155
See generally Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)
156
See, e.g., Patent Acts 1990, § 40(3) (Austl.) (“The claim or claims must be clear and
succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification.”), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ (last visited May 16, 2005).
157
See, e.g., generally Patents Act 2004 (Eng.) (updating several provision of UK patent
law to conform with the European Patent Convention).
153
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that. That is the basis of our patent law. So the fact that other
people cannot enter the market with that particular invention is the
basis for patent law.
We have a lot of people who come to us and say, “Our patent
protection is so important, it’s indispensable to the development of
my company.” The thing is, to us the benefit is the patent; even
though somebody else cannot enter the market, that information is
disclosed and available.
I know the question was raised about whether there is a new
invention out there and someone wants to do research on it and
they are precluded from doing research on it if it has got any kind
of commercial purpose. There is the limited “experimental use”
exception that’s not based in statute but is judicially based.158
Without having the patent law and having the invention
disclosed, the third party wouldn’t know it was there to even
consider doing research on it. So we have to keep that balance.
We just haven’t seen a lot of evidence—you know, we have
heard a lot of people talk about it and speculate—but we haven’t
seen companies and researchers say that the patent law is
preventing them from investing and doing research. It depends on
what side you’re on, and that is important, but overall we have not
seen a lot of evidence where research has not progressed as a result
of the current policies.
I mean we have had huge development in the biotech industry
and in the computer software industries despite patent
protection.159
There has been growth of new industries,
predominantly in the United States, and we have probably the
strongest patent protection in the world in these areas.160 So I am

158

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S.
958 (2003); Integra v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), amended by Nos. 02-1052,
02-1065, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (June 6, 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72
U.S.L.W. 3568 (U.S. Mar 2, 2004) (No. 03-1237).
159
See, e.g., John Waggoner, Biotech’s Booms Can Be Tempting, U.S.A. TODAY, May
7, 2004, at 3B (discussing the rapid growth in the biotech industry between 2003 and
2004).
160
See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from
United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit
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not really seeing the correlation between having patent protection
and not having development and progress, and that is what the
constitutional basis is; to have progress.161 I think there has been a
lot of progress here.
Now, I do recognize that sometimes we do issue patents that
got through the system and that there are instances where I think
everyone would benefit from a post-grant examination proceeding,
opposition proceeding, and that is something that we do favor in
the US-PTO and we have been looking at for several years now.
But I do agree with David that the patent laws and the
patentees are subject to the antitrust laws.162 That is 100 percent
accurate. If there is abuse in the marketplace, then the patentee
should be 100 percent liable for that. But just because there are a
few bad actors, does that mean there is a need for changing the
whole basis of the system?
We talked a little bit about Hatch-Waxman. I think part of the
problem with talking about the pharmaceutical industry is that we
do have this Hatch-Waxman law that is this very complex mixed
hybrid between the patent law and the FDA rules.163 But even
then, again, there were so many generic applications filed. It was
only a small percentage of bad actors again in those cases.
I think that the report reveals what I would call some very
serious antitrust-type anticompetitive behavior on the part of, not
only the brand name, but also the generic companies who colluded
to take this money for just staying off the market.164
Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L.REV. 917, 923 (2004) (discussing the United
States’ lack of a broad statutory experimental use doctrine).
161
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162
See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000))
(“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.”); see
generally Joel I. Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1123.pdf (discussing the intersection of
antitrust and patent law).
163
See generally Douglas A. Robinson, Recent Administrative Reforms of the HatchWaxman Act: Lower Prices Now In Exchange for Less Pharmaceutical Innovation
Later?, 81 WASH U.L.Q. 829, 836−840 (2003) (discussing the effect of the HatchWaxman Act).
164
See A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS,
Sept. 23, 2002, at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8038/8038biogenerics2.html
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And there have been some recent changes to the HatchWaxman law to prohibit automatic extensions—things like a
thirty-month stay,165 and what has to be listed.166 Because the new
Amendment allows for a second generic filer to obtain an
exclusivity period, the first generic filer under the new regime, is
not in the same bargaining position.167
There are other things to be done rather than tinkering with the
patent system in whole to address these really bad actors.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
Now we will take from the floor here and then we’ll come back
to our panelists after we have heard a bit more from the floor.
Could you say who you are, please?
QUESTION: Joseph Balacca.
I think part of the problem with identifying certain patents as
being overly broad, or just bad patents, is the uncertainty that
results from an interpretation of the claims. This is a consequence
of the changes brought by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“CAFC”) in the meaning of “doctrine of equivalents” and
“file wrapper estoppel.”168 You come to a point in your practice in
which you spend an awful lot of money and time examining
(Marketing of generic products can be delayed through various maneuvers—in which
generic companies and innovator drugmakers are either pitted against each other or work
hand in hand) (emphasis added).
165
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(IV)
(2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)).
166
Id
167
Id; see also Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent
Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 620 (2005).
Under the ‘Forfeiture’ clause codified in 21 U.S.C. §355 (j) (5) (D) & (I), a
“First Applicant” may forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if it fails to market its
product within 75 days after it receives FDA approval or 30 months after
ANDA submission whichever is earlier; or 75 days after a non-appealed
favorable district court or favorable Federal Circuit court decision has been
rendered; or 75 days after a favorable settlement has been entered; or 75 days
after the patent expires or is withdrawn.
Id.
168
See Symposium, The End of Equivalents? Examining the Fallout after Festo, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 727 (2003) (discussing the effect of file
wrapper and presecution history estoppel on the doctrine of equivalents).
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competitors’ patents and trying to determine exactly what is
covered by them. Then you look at it, you order up the file
wrappers, and you have no basis for telling your client exactly
what is claimed because of the uncertainty brought about by claim
interpretation.169 The claims should be limited to what they recite
and you should be able to depend upon that.
If the CAFC and the Supreme Court could produce a final,
definitive statement as to what constitutes “doctrine of
equivalents” and “file wrapper estoppel,” and make them narrow
enough to be understandable and fairly applied across all different
technologies, that would go a long way to removing these
questionable patents. Then, companies could then rely upon
advice of counsel as to what is permitted and what is not permitted.
Any comments?
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think it is a great idea, but I don’t know if
it is practical. The doctrine of equivalents–people have tried to
figure out how to deal with that for hundreds of years—and
ultimately it’s an equitable doctrine, occasionally applied on a
case-by-case basis when it is needed.170 It is really no more than
that, and I don’t see how you would define it in any precise way.
File wrapper estoppel is different. I think you can have rules
for that. I think the Federal Circuit is trying to sort that out in
Festo and its progeny,171 and maybe we’ll get some closure on that
in the next ten years, when the last few cases are decided.
So I think there will be some more certainty in file wrapper
estoppel,172 but on doctrine of equivalents, I think its whole

169

See id. (noting that the Federal Circuit reverses district courts fifty percent of the
time on claim interpretation).
170
See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 786 (noting that the doctrine is a highly factual inquiry
that is applied at the time of infringement).
171
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740
(2002) (holding that prosecution history estoppel arises when an amendment is made to
secure a patent and narrow the scope of the patent).
172
See Narda Microwave Corp. v. General Microwave Corp., 675 F.2d 542, 549 (2d
Cir. 1982) (holding that a patent that preceded the sale of another item was not novel in
design); Square Liner 360, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 370 (8th Cir. 1982); IngersollRand Co. v. Brunner & Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 491, 497–98 (5th Cir. 1973); 60 AM. JUR. 2D
Patents § 291.
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purpose is not to have certainty.173 Therefore, I think you always
need it for certain cases.
MR. RICHARDS: As one who was brought up in the UK,
which has a tradition of literal claim interpretation, that has its
problems as well.174 There is an advantage to having a penumbra
around the case to deal with the exceptional circumstance where
you need it, and that clearly makes it difficult to give advice. But
that’s what we’re paid for.
PARTICIPANT: Also we’re waiting for the en banc decision
on claim construction.175 It would be nice if the panels at the
Federal Circuit were consistent, but they are not.176 So it really is
the luck of the draw on the day you walk in for your argument.
I’m looking forward to seeing what they have to say in the latest en
banc decision on claim construction.
MR. RICHARDS: It’s astonishing that we have had claims
since 1832, and in the present form since 1870 and the Federal
Circuit sends out a request saying “please tell us what we’re
supposed to do with these.”177 It’s absolutely astonishing in my
view.
PARTICIPANT: Don’t you think that some of the discrepancy
in the written description recurrence stems from case law that
interprets it before we had claims in the patent system which kind
of elevated the requirements to a different level for interpreting?
173

See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 786 (noting that the inquiry is highly factual and
applied at time of infringement).
174
See, e.g., Festo, 535 U.S. 722 at 731–33. “If patents were always interpreted by their
literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished.” Id. at 731.
175
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 375 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1269) (order
granting rehearing en banc); see generally Gregory A. Castanias, Intellectual Property
Commentaries: A Report on the Federal Circuit’s En Banc Oral Argument on The Rules
of Patent Claim Construction (Feb. 2005), at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/
pubs_detail.aspx?pubid=39465603 (discussing the pending Philips v. AWH case) (last
visited Apr. 3, 2005).
176
See Gregory J. Gallagher, Recent Development: The Federal Circuit and Claim
Construction: Resolving the Conflict between the Claims and the Written Description, 4
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 121, 121 (2002) (Comparing the Federal Circuit’s “canons of
construction” between the written description of a claim and the claim itself. One may
not read limitation into a claim from a written description or one may look to a written
description to determine meaning in a claim.).
177
See Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
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You know, we have the 1952 Act,178 and we do have claims,
but a lot of the cases that I have seen the court relying on are from
the era before the Act.179
MR. RICHARDS: We have had claims in their present
formulation since about 1870 and we have had claims in some
form since 1832. There is not much pre-1832 case law.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think the written description requirement
stems from a fundamentally different path than the enablement
requirement.180 The written description requirement stems from
the notion that when someone reads your patent, they should have
some understanding of what your invention is.181 The courts said
that you “possess” your invention.182
The requirement exists so that, when reading the patent, the
reader can get some idea of the scope of it by reading it apart from
what the words of the claim say. That is really a different
requirement than enablement, which is a requirement that says you
have to teach how to do it.183 So I think they are separate and
distinct, and there are reasons for each.
178

The Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.(2000)).
179
See, e.g., Festo, 535 U.S. 722 at 732 (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330,
(1854)).
180
See, e.g., Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that an
applicant must convey with clear and convincing clarity in a written description that he
was the first to possess it, whereas an enablement only explains how to make and use the
invention).
181
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that the written requirement teaches the public how to use an invention in
exchange for a limited monopoly on that patent).
182
See Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1348 (“The purpose of the ‘written description’ requirement
is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make and use’; the applicant must also convey
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or
she was in possession of the invention.”) (emphasis in the original); Application of
LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 1134 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
We think it is sound law, consistent with the public policy underlying our
patent law, that before any publication can amount to a statutory bar to the
grant of a patent, its disclosure must be such that a skilled artisan could take its
teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in
possession of the invention.
Id.
183
See Noelle, 355 F.3d at 1348 (noting that enablement merely requires an applicant to
convey how to “make and use” an invention).
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I don’t think it is just caused by the 1952 Act. There plainly
are at least three judges in the Federal Circuit who would like to
get rid of the written description requirement.184 I’m not so sure
why, but they plainly want to do that. I mean it’s no mystery. It’s
just Judge Rader and a couple others.185 Whether that will happen
or not is hard to know.
But, at least at the moment, I think the requirement exists and it
will continue. If you listen to the ones who want to get rid of it,
they want to leave it in priority contests and get rid of it
everywhere else.
MR. RICHARDS: Can you give your name, please?
QUESTION: Michelle Baker. I’m an individual.
It seems to me that the question of patent thickets is a very
different issue, a very different problem, from overly broad
patents.186 The remedy should be very different. Generally, patent
thickets are overly narrow patents or many narrow patents.187
Maybe there doesn’t even need to be a remedy in that case because
you can invent around this problem, assuming that you get around
the cost of figuring out what the patent actually is claiming. So by
lumping patent thickets with overly broad patents, I think you will
find the wrong remedies.
184

See Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 464 (2003).
185
See id. at 1322–27 (Rader, J. concurring) (arguing that “by making written
description a free-standing disclosure doctrine, [the Federal Circuit] produces numerous
unintended and deleterious consequences”).
186
Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and
African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 349–50
(2004).
This pattern—the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and
the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries—has created what some call
a patent thicket in biotechnology: ‘an overlapping set of patent rights requiring
that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from
multiple patentees.’ The patent thicket is a problem because useful innovation
in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies. The field
of biotechnology is particularly dependent on the cumulative work of many
researchers, and therefore is vulnerable to the ‘anticommons’ problem
mentioned earlier.
Id.
187
See Janet L. McDavis & Minda Schechter, The FTC’s Recent Report, NAT’L L.J.,
Dec. 8, 2003, at 13.
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MR. RICHARDS: I think the patent thicket issue tends to come
up in those industries where you’ve got multiple patents on a
particular product. Then, everybody needs to get their patents to
trade, to get a license from somebody else to be able to put the
product on the market, which tends to be the electrical end of the
spectrum rather than the chemical end of the spectrum.
QUESTIONER: That’s right. But if you think about the fact
that each patent is presumably an innovation of some sort, when
you have a patent thicket, generally those thickets are minor
innovations, or you could at least make that argument. There are
costs.
MR. BYE: The CEO of one of the businesses that came in to us
testified that he gave a whole series of patents on a particular area
of software technology to his engineers and said, “Can you get a
sense of what the patent landscape is?” The engineers went away
and they came back a week later and they said, “We really have no
idea. We think all these patents probably infringe on each other
and they probably infringe our product, and we really can’t be sure
either way.”
Thickets definitely are a different problem to overly broad
patents.188 There is no clear solution to it. It is a matter of making
sure that you issue patents that do comply with the statutory
requirements and doing things like that. There is no master stroke,
unfortunately, that you can do to solve a problem like that.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I don’t know why you would rely on
engineers to decide on the scope of patents . That’s why you have
lawyers. So that doesn’t make any sense to me at all.
QUESTIONER: Well, also, patent thickets are only relevant to
big firms. What they do is sort of defensive patenting and they’re
just trading off the rights. They do not necessarily promote
innovation.189
188

See generally id. (describing patent thickets as arising from numerous narrow patents
and not overly broad patents).
189
See Symposium, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment, Biotechnology in the
Federal Circuit: A Clockwork Lemon, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 451–52 (2004) (“Patent
thickets block follow-on innovation; an innovator must metaphorically cut her way
through the underbrush in order to complete a project that she wants to accomplish.”)
(statement of Dan L. Burk); see also Mueller, supra note 163 at 944–45 n.130.
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MR. SCHWARTZ: I think the phrase, “patent thicket,” gets
used in two different contexts. I agree that in one context it’s used
by one person who has a lot of different patents covering different
features, and that has certainly been done in the past. I think it is
also used in your context, by a lot of different people that have
patents that are arguably overlapping or arguably one is an
improvement on the other, and that in itself becomes a “thicket.”190
In a number of industries, the practical resolution of this
problem has been standard-setting and licenses under standards.191
At least in a lot of industries that has really worked out pretty well.
You don’t need the FTC to hit you over the head to decide to do
that. In an awful lot of the electronic and telecommunications
industries that’s what they have.192 There are standard-setting
organizations and arrangements to license patents in standardsetting organizations. In most situations that works reasonably
well.193
To me, again, it’s a pejorative term that doesn’t follow as much
in the real world.
QUESTION: My name is Raymond Dowd. My area of
practice is copyright and trademark litigation. I am not a patent
attorney.

190

Compare Bessen, supra note 58, at 1 (stating thickets “occur when each
product [involves] many patents . . .”) with McDavis & Schechter, supra note 187, at 13
(discussing narrow patents as the basis for patent thickets).
191
See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998) at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm. (last visited May 16, 2005) (noting
how cross-licensing has allowed innovation in the DVD industry).
192
See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, Abstract (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2005).
The need to navigate the patent thicket and hold-up is especially pronounced in
industries such as telecommunications and computing in which formal
standard-setting is a core part of bringing new technologies to market. Crosslicenses and patent pools are two natural and effective methods used by market
participants to cut through the patent thicket, but each involves some
transaction costs.
Id.
193
See id.
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I was wondering if there has been discussion over developing
some sort of compulsory licensing system, particularly where the
U.S. government funds the innovation that leads to the creation of
a patent. Would a system of compulsory licensing make sense to
any of the members of the panel as a resolution to some of these
issues?
MR. SCHWARTZ: First of all, for government funding, I think
there usually is compulsory licensing.194 But as far as the United
States goes, one of the reasons that people, especially in the
pharmaceutical industry, are very much opposed to compulsory
licensing is they believe that would be the death knell of
innovation.195
The heart of the matter is that it is not coincidental that the
major pharmaceutical research in the world is done in the United
States, which is one of the few countries that has a strong patent
system with no compulsory license. That justifies the investment,
at least in pharmaceuticals, to be worth bringing it to market.196
There may be circumstances where compulsory licensing
makes sense–and some countries are in favor of it–but I think the
basic notion has been debated for 200 years at least and has been
continually rejected up until now.
MR. RICHARDS: Sir?
QUESTION: My name is Jean-Paul Ciardullo. I’m a staff
member of the Journal.
When you were talking about overlapping and overly broad
patents being issued to the same companies or individuals, what do

194

See The Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2004)).
195
See Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects on the Conflict
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
711, 716 (2003) (noting that the grant of a license without the patent holder’s
authorization limits the exclusivity period and allows he recipient to engage in
competitive imitation, which would lessen the original incentive to innovate).
196
See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An
Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 304 (1994)
(attributing the financial growth of the pharmaceutical industry to exclusivity provided by
patent law).
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you think the role of terminal disclaimers could play in abating that
problem?197
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think terminal disclaimers are useful and
you have them when they are appropriate, but I don’t think they
really deal with what the FTC is talking about.
MS. CRITHARIS: Terminal disclaimers are filed only by the
same applicant, so you cannot have them for different
companies.198 It is only when there is double-patenting involved
and it is the same inventive entity.199 So the fact that you have
different companies out there, you really do not have terminal
disclaimer practice.
QUESTIONER: Even for, let’s say, the same company, if you
have one pharmaceutical company that is coming in and trying to
get perhaps unfair extensions on what is effectively the same
product?
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think nowadays you are really stuck with
a twenty-year term.200 I think the twenty-year term has really
eliminated all of that. You are stuck with a twenty-year term from
date of application and that does offer you protection within that
time.201
I think you have to terminally disclaim. You’ve got to
terminally disclaim the continuations because you’re stuck with it
anyway.
QUESTIONER: Just one more comment. When we talk about
extensions of patents, especially in the pharmaceutical area, that is
really no longer innovation; that is just trying to keep the product
on the market that has already been innovated maybe twenty years
earlier. So I don’t see that activity as putting a chilling effect on
true innovation where you have to look at projections into the
future. The technology developed today may not become a
197

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2005) (a terminal disclaimer is used when an applicant has
two or more applications pending wherein the subject matter is so closely related it
appears that it is an attempt to get numerous patents on the single invention).
198
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) (2005).
199
See USPTO MANUAL, supra note 37, § 804.02
200
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
201
See id.
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commercial reality for another twenty years. So I just see that as
kind of holding on to what you already have, rather than what you
will have. I don’t think it has a chilling effect on true innovation.
What does the panel think?
MR. RICHARDS: I think the problem in the pharmaceutical
industry tends to be where you come up with a new formulation
towards the end of the life of the basic patent. You decide that a
particular polymorph, a particular form of the crystallized product,
is the thing which is really the great thing rather than the sort of
generic disclosure that you had twenty years ago.
There are arguments, pro and con, on that. There is no reason
why—if it really is an invention—just because it is relatively
minor as compared to the main one, that you shouldn’t be entitled
to a patent for it. The other question is, is it really an invention,
and that’s where the examination issue comes up again.
MR. BYE: The critical thing is the presence or absence of
generic competition. Where you have this sort of patent life
extension, you may be preventing generic companies from entering
those markets, thereby denying consumers low-cost drug
products.202 Innovation is critical. Competition is also critical.
You have to have both components and you have to have them
working in some balance.
QUESTION: That was my only point. That is the competition.
But I don’t think it has any chilling effect on innovation or on new
technologies that would spur our economy as a country in the
future. That is my feeling.
MS. CRITHARIS: I would like to add that before the
enactment of Hatch-Waxman,203 which was in 1984, the generic
market was a very small component of the marketplaceI think it
was less than 19 percent.204 Since Hatch-Waxman, it is now,
202

See Chris Adams & Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent
Extensions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002, at A24.
203
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271, 282 (2000)).
204
See Merrill Matthews, Patent Protection for Me, But Not For You, June 14, 1002, at
http://www.cnehealth.org/pubs/IPI-PatentProtection.pdf (noting that “the generic industry
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according to the FTC report, upwards of 45 or 50 percent.205 So
the Hatch-Waxman Act did really spur generic competition, which
is a great thing.206 I mean we are trying to find just the right
balance, which is a difficult thing, especially in the pharmaceutical
area. We are talking about access to medicines.
But I think it is important to point out that patents get a twentyyear term from filing.207 The problem in the pharmaceutical area is
that even though you may get a patent, you might not get
marketing approval from the FDA to enter the market until much
later. That is why it is important to have some kind of patent
termwe don’t call it “extension”restoration, because that
patentee had no market exclusivity at all because he can’t enter the
market until he gets FDA approval.
Studies have indicated that the average life of a pharmaceutical
patent is really only about ten or eleven years because they have
lost all that time in regulatory approval.208 So there is just a
mechanism to compensate the patent owner, to at least get some
more exclusivitynot more than other patentees, but just to give
him some, because in some cases they are left with five or seven
years, and that is really just not enough.
MR. BALTO: Wait. I can’t let you get away with that. They
have a monopoly for the five-to-seven years, or three years, or
whatever it is, and they will price at the monopoly price, and they
will recover what they recover, whether you give them an

has also prospered under Hatch-Waxman. Its share of the prescription drug market has
grown from 19 percent of the volume in 1984 to 47 percent in 2000, according to IMS
Health).
205
See Ashoke Bhattacharjya, FTC Health Care Workshop Panel on Branded and
Generic Pharmaceuticals (Sept. 10, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/healthcare/
bhatta.pdf (Sept. 10, 2002).
206
See id.
207
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
208
See The Biojudiciary Project, Patent Life, Generic Drugs, and the Drug Approval
Process, at http://www.biojudiciary.org/subpage1.asp?tid=110 (last visited May 9,
2005).(“the long FDA approval process strips a large fraction of the twenty-year patent
term and decreases the patent life of a drug.”).
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eighteen-year patent or a three-year patent. That’s what economics
shows.209
But I want to go back to a point you made earlier about
questionable patents. I don’t wantwell, actually, personally I do
wantall of you to leave the room and think that there is no
problem of questionable patents, because that means that Matthew
and I will have enough work to do when you misinform your
clients in the future about what they can and cannot do. That will
result in substantial legal fees to my law firm.
It is very valuable to read the testimony of the FTC hearings.210
You hear this over and over again in the testimony from business
people in many different industries.211 The problem is that they are
spending money to go and create patents and to do regulatory
filings, so that they are in a bargaining position to enter into crosslicensing arrangements.
I have no qualms about protecting intellectual property rights
when what is being protected is real invention, when what is
happening is protecting the incentives to innovate. But when what
you are doing is creating regulatory gauntlets, wars of mutual
destruction, where people just try to overwhelm each other with
patent filings and creating mutually adverse thickets, I don’t think
you are creating any kinds of incentives as to innovation.
One more point. The important empirical studies that are cited
in the FTC report212you know, are patents questionable? What
happens when patents are effectively litigated?
They are
oftentimes struck down. They are struck down a remarkably great
amount of times.213
209

See, e.g., generally Grid Systems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp.
1033, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that a patent holder may charge the maximum price
that the market can bear).
210
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2005)
(listing the relevant hearings and providing links to speeches).
211
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 5–7 (summarizing the
various testimony by industrial representatives on defensive patent practices and patent
thickets).
212
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch.2, p. 11.
213
See, e.g., Univ. of Houston Law Center, U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, at
http://www.patstats.org/ (last visited May 9, 2005). (illustrating the number of times a
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Now, you may say that is not a problem because there are
plenty of avenues for people to challenge patents or bring antitrust
suits to challenge anticompetitive activity.214 The problem
identified by the FTC report is that not everybody can sue, not
everybody has the resources to go and sue and try to challenge an
invalid patent, especially the way the patent litigation system is
currently set up.215
So the FTC report says, “Here are a few adjustments to the
patent litigation system that will make it work more effectively.”216
It doesn’t say, “Let’s go and cut back on these rights substantially”
or anything like that. It is just saying, “Let’s overcome these
barriers so people can truly vindicate their intellectual property
rights or appropriately challenge them.”217
MR. SCHWARTZ: I couldn’t disagree more. It just seems to
me that’s simply not so. There are two pieces to the FTC report.218
The piece about having an alternative mechanism for challenging
patents is not new at the FTC.219 They have just hopped on the
bandwagon of lots of other people. There needs to be a way to
challenge patents in the PTO. Everyone agrees with that.
The second piece of it, which David calls tinkering and the
FTC calls tinkering, is a fundamental change in the law to make it
easier to invalidate patents.220 That is really what is going on in
the FTC report.

patent owner prevailed compared to the number of times an alleged infringer infringer
prevailed between the years of 2000 to 2004)
214
See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report to Congress On Inter
Partes
Examination,
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/
reexamreport.pdf (discussing the inter partes challenges to patents).
215
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 6 (stating that existing
avenues to challenging patent validity or assess potential infringement present prohibitive
costs).
216
See generally id. at Executive Summary, 7–17 (discussing the FTC’s proposed
reforms).
217
See, e.g., id. at ch. 5, 31–32.
218
See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 2. (discussing FTC recommendations to
allow post-grant review and to change the standard of review for evidence necessary to
invalidate a patent)
219
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at 7−9 (discussing new legislative recommendations).
220
See id. at Executive Summary, 8–11.
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That is what is going on by changing the burden of proof from
clear and convincing evidence, to a mere preponderance of the
evidence standard.221 As someone who has litigated patents, I
know of no single change effected by the Federal Circuit that had
more long-term effect in sustaining patents’ validity. I think that
this goes to the heart of the FTC’s attempt and desire to, in effect,
get rid of that and erode that and turn it back to the days when
patents are, as a practical matter, presumed invalid.222
That’s what this is all about, and I decry it as a terrible idea, not
a little tinkering.
MR. BALTO: Herb, let’s just stick with that last idea about the
burdens of proof. I, as just a general litigator look at that and say,
“I think the FTC’s argument is sound about why it shouldn’t be
clear and convincing.” You know, when you look at general
litigation, this looks like the appropriate thing for a challenge
under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Maybe
Matthew knows more examples than I do. But clear and
convincing just basically sets such a high bar that very few people
are going to be able to effectively challenge the patents.223
MR. SCHWARTZ: That’s contrary to what you said a few
minutes ago, where 50 percent of patents are held invalid. That
can’t possibly be. The standard has allowed significant numbers of
patents to be held invalid.
The previous standard of preponderance of the evidence was
such that, ultimately it got to the point where the Supreme Court
said, “No patent has been held to be valid that has ever come
221

Brenda Sandburg, FTC Floats Controversial Plan (Oct. 29, 2003), at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1067350952811; Anna Vishey, Patent Industry
Responds to FTC Recommendations (Fall 2004), at http://www.srz.com/PDF-files/ipfa04—vishev.pdf. (discussing the FTC’s proposed reduction of the standard of “clear and
convincing evidence” to a “Preponderance of evidence” for the invalidation of patents) to
reduce litigation risk)
222
David C. Bohrer, Knocking the Eagle Off the Patent Owner’s Shoulder: Chiron
Holds that
Jurors Don’t Have to Be Told That a Patent is Presumed Valid, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 259, 271–72 (2004).
223
See Symposium, Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform of The Patent System:
Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 923 (2004)
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before us.”224 The Federal Circuit was trying to put some balance
into the enforcement of patents and to get rid of the notion that, at
least in the Eighth Circuit, no patent was sustained for thirty years.
That is what you got with the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
I think clear and convincing was an attempt to remedy it. As
far as I know, considering the numbers of patents that are held
invalid, which I think is still very high225, it suggests that it is still
working.
That doesn’t go to the other point, which I agree with: that you
need an additional way to deal with patents in the PTO. Simply
going to litigation is not a sensible solution for an awful lot of
controversies. To me, that is the most important thing. The FTC is
certainly on the right bandwagon on that, but it is very different
than to me changing the standard of proof.
MR. BYE: The number of patents that are invalidated, the
statistic is not the critical thing. If you say, “Well, 50 percent are
invalidated; therefore, that’s a good amount,” that is essentially a
meaningless number.
The critical question is: is the standard that we are applying
appropriate for the examination that the patents get? The current
standard is deemed too high for three main reasons.
One is that patent law and patent regulations favor the
applicant. There are a number of presumptions that basically force
examiners to issue things unless they can essentially produce a
counter-argument.226 These examiners are operating under very
tight time constraints, as I mentioned before, eight to twenty-five
hours. So the burden is essentially put on them to rebut the
application.

224

Jungersen v. Ostby, 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (“[I] doubt that the remedy for such
Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this Court for
striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not
been able to get its hands on.”) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
225
See Univ. of Houston Law Center, supra note 213.
226
See Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (1990) (describing how 35 U.S.C. 132
can be violated by an examiner for failing to provide adequate reasons for rejecting a
patent application).
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Second, the whole examination process is ex parte,227 there is
no one else involved, so the patent sort of slides through. And it is
examined on a preponderance standard.228
Third, when the patent is issued and you take it to court,
suddenly the standard to protect it is clear and convincing.229
There is an imbalance there. The treatment that it gets in the
examination stage doesn’t warrant that higher standard when it
gets into court.
I will confess there have been quite strong reactions to this
recommendation. Some patent litigators say it is the worst thing
that could ever be done to the patent system. But there are also
many other patent litigators who said, “Yes, actually we think
that’s a really sensible idea. We think that would be an
improvement to the system.” It is not clear what the correct view
is, but I think this is an important issue and needs to be considered.
QUESTION: But, patents are not just granted without any
foundation. I have been involved in litigation in getting patents. If
you think it is that easy, it isn’t. When you have an examiner who
is really giving you a hard time on certain issues, those issues are
thoroughly documented on the record.
I think what Herb is saying is that the standard that we
currently face in litigation takes into account the fact that you have
had this examination on the merits. If you find evidence that
wasn’t part of that record, then you can more easily meet the clear
and convincing standard.
Do you disagree, Herb?
MR. SCHWARTZ: No, I don’t disagree with that at all. To
me, in practice the clear and convincing standard has been working
well.
QUESTIONER: It makes sense.

227

35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 307 (2002).
See USPTO MANUAL,, supra note 37, § 2142.
229
See David W. Okey, Issued Patents and the Standard of Proof: Evidence Clear and
Convincing or Merely Ponderous, 17 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 557
(Winter 1999), available at http://www.jcil.org/journal/articles/206.html.
228
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MR. SCHWARZ: There has been no hue and cry against it. In
fact, the only organization that has really come out and tried to
change it is the FTC, who fundamentally wants to get rid of patents
anyway.
QUESTIONER: I mean we’re not South Africa, which just
issues patents without examination.
MR. BYE: Can I just say that’s absolutely not true that we
want to get rid of patents.
MR. SCHWARTZ: You certainly do.
MR. BYE: Throughout the entire report it discusses how
important patents are to driving innovation. They are a critical
aspect in many industries. We might not even have some
industries without them.
Back in the 1960s and the 1970s, the patent and antitrust
doctrines tended to butt a lot of heads, and many of the problems
were due to antitrust enforcement,230 which wasn’t really anchored
in any conceptual framework. Since the early 1980s and moving
forward, antitrust has incorporated economics into its analysis and
its treatment of patents is quite different to what it used to be.231
The FTC firmly acknowledges the importance of patents. So I
think it is important to correct that misperception.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I would suggest you to read the report of
the National Science Foundation, called “A Patent System for the
21st Century.”232 That was a group that does not have a
particularly either pro-patent bias or anti-patent bias. They happen
to be a group of people on all sides of this subject. They have
written a very, I think, interesting and provocative report.
They agree on the basic notions of strengthening the patent
system by having a post-application review system and
strengthening the Patent Office.233 They do not, at all, get into
what I would consider to be the more controversial patent-bashing
230
See Gary Stix, IP Rights – And Wrongs, SCI. AM., May 2002, at 38, available at
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~engrtutr/IPRights.pdf. (discussing the effect of aggressive
antitrust enforcement on patent applications)
231
See id. (noting the increase in the number of patents granted from 1980 to 2001)
232
NAS REPORT, supra note 73.
233
See id.
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aspects of the FTC report, and that is really the startling difference
between the two.
When you look at the people who put this together and you
look at the FTC report, you are left with the conclusion that, no
matter what the gentleman says here, the FTC is fundamentally
looking for a mechanism to weaken patents.234
The National Science Foundation report is an attempt to look at
both sides of this problem and see what can be done to strengthen
innovation overall and look at the good, the bad, and the ugly and
try to clean up the system.235 In other words, I think that it is a
balanced and fair report and I don’t believe that is true with the
FTC report. I think if anyone would read the two, you would
begin to understand why I say that.
MR. RICHARDS: Mary wants to say something.
MS. CRITHARIS: I have a question. I’ve pretty much only
worked for the Patent Office. I worked in private practice before
for a little while, and I did work at the Solicitor’s Office in the
Patent Office, which defends the cases.
My understanding has always been, from most litigators, that
when you go to litigation, there is not an issue of whether there
was a good examination or not. The issue is litigation usually
involves the introduction of prior art that was not considered by the
examiner doing the prosecution of the application.
But I think to make the implication that Matthew was making,
that things slide by, I think that is a little incorrect.236 I was an
examiner for five years. I issued about nine or ten patents a year.
That’s a very low percentage rate. Most of the people in our unit
had a very low percentage rate. Because it was chemical arts, a lot
of stuff was pretty much already known. It is different in some of
the other areas.

234
See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, pp. 18–23 (stating the patent
protection was strengthened by the courts during the 1980s and implying a better balance
must be reached to achieve proper competition).
235
See NAS REPORT, supra note 73. (suggesting reforms to the current system of
patents)
236
See supra text accompanying note 227.
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But I don’t know if it is fair to necessarily say that a poorquality patent gets litigated. Some things go to litigation and I
don’t know if it has to do with whether the quality of the patent is
poor.
So I guess I’d like to ask Herb, and the others what their
experience is with that.
MR. SCHWARTZ: As I said, I have never heard of the
concept, other than in the FTC report, of what they call “poorquality patents.”237 Usually when you litigate patents and you are
litigating the issue of validity, it is about art that wasn’t before the
Patent Office. It is very rare in this day and age to re-litigate over
art that was before the Office. When all is said and done, the art
usually has been considered by the Office and it is very hard to
persuade a hearing officer that it should come out differently.
I don’t think that it matters whether the standard is clear and
convincing or a preponderance of the evidence. The usual issues
are new art or publicationsa lot of times it’s publications that the
Office didn’t seeand certainly if the art is a prior public use it
raises issues of invalidity that most likely could not have been
before the PTO office.
So I think a lot of the issues are ones that could never have
arisen in the Patent Office. I’ve been involved on both sides of this
argument: whether or not the arguments made in the Patent Office
should have persuaded the Office differently. Ultimately, it is a
very hard argument to make out either way.
MR. BALTO: Matthew, you would be doing a disservice to
yourself to accept on face value what Herb tells you about the FTC
report. It would be sort of like watching the American League
Championship Series and turning off the TV after the third game.
If you look at the specific chapter that deals with the point that
we are rigorously debating,238 you will see a very moderate, evenhanded tone going to the burden of proof issue, and not using
pejorative terms, as is suggested. Rather, this chapter looks very

237
238

See FTC REPORT, supra note 2 at Executive Summary, 5.
Id. at ch. 5.
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carefully at what is being patented and the obstacles such patents
create for innovation.239
That is the issue that we are faced with on this program today:
is the intellectual property regulation working in such a fashion
that it actually stifles innovation?
MR. RICHARDS: Matthew?
MR. BYE: I would commend the National Academy’s report to
people. I think it is a fabulous report. All the evidence that they
used in that report is exactly the same evidence that we rely on in
our report.240
I also want to point out one of the major recommendations they
do make; they say there are problems with the obviousness
standard, that too many obvious patents are being issued, the
standards are not right, and they should be tightened up to prevent
this happening.241 That almost exactly overlaps with one of the
recommendations we make.242
The other thing I want to get back to, which is the statement I
began my presentation with, is that you have to be mindful of the
two spheres we are dealing with here—the sphere of innovation
that competition can promote and the sphere of innovation that the
patent system can promote. If you increase one, you affect the
other.
The critical thing is to put them in a proper balance and be
mindful that if you adjust things in the patent system you might be
displacing competition, and competition is the baseline, as the
Supreme Court says, of the U.S. economy.243 This balance is a
very important fact to be mindful of.
MR. RICHARDS: Anything more from the audience?
239

Id.
Compare NAS REPORT, supra note 73 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2.
241
See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 10–12 (discussing
obviousness in “Recommendation #3”).
242
See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 9–11.
243
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (holding
that “Federal patent laws embody ‘a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.’”); FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 1, p.
3.
240
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David, maybe you would like to sum up.
QUESTION: One question. My name is Judy Bass. I am a
media lawyer in private practice, but I don’t do patents.
I actually found it somewhat interesting that there is this sort of
tension going on within the government. I have never seen the
government work so well to both safeguard competition and also to
try to curb it in the right way.
I am wondering what happens with this report now, these
recommendations. You mentioned these town hall meetings are
going to happen. Ultimately is this a legislative matter? What
would have to happen to get some of these innovations, either in an
administrative proceeding or whatever, to take effect? What is the
next step?
MR. BYE: There are a number of steps that could be taken.
Many of the recommendations we make discuss legislative reform,
like creating this post-grant review procedure or giving the PTO
more funding.244 There are other recommendations we make that
could be addressed through court decisions, and that is one of the
things we note, that we are going to have an increasing role in
filing amicus briefs. Then, the perspective we bring to bear on
these issues can be delivered to courts at that sort of range.245
Those are two areas that things can happen.
Another great thing this report has done, it has spurred so much
debate across the country. We even had a professor visit recently
from Japan who said that she is discussing this report with her
colleagues in Japan. It has a lot of academics talking. It has
inspired people who work in law reform to start thinking about
these ideas and incorporating them throughout the patent system.
MR. RICHARDS: David, would you like to make some
closing remarks, then Herb, and then if either of the government
speakers want to say anything more?
244
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, Executive Summary, at 7–8, 12–13 (discussing postgrant review procedure in Recommendation #1 and adequate funding for the PTO in
“Recommendation #4”).
245
See id. at Executive Summary, 17–18 (discussing the need to increase
communication between antitrust agencies and patent institutions through the use of
Amicus Briefs).
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MR. BALTO: No. Herb.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I really don’t have much to say in closing.
I think I’ve made my views fairly clear.
I would say, going back to your comment about the NSF
report, yes they do discuss a non-obvious standard, but they
discuss it in a couple of very specific areas where there have been
some issues, in business method patents and gene sequence
patents.246 They do not suggest changing the statutory framework.
They suggest a reasoned approach to try to work it out.247
That is fundamentally different from what the FTC is doing in
this area. The FTC is, in effect, suggesting very specific changes
in the basic ground rule of how obviousness should be
determined.248 Such a change would be effected by either
legislation or court decision, and my guess is presumably
legislation, since I doubt that they will persuade the Federal Circuit
to put in the changes they are suggesting by court decision.249
Now, certainly they are entitled to take that position. I don’t
quarrel with their right to do it. But to suggest that they are on the
same page as the National Science Foundation is not fair.
MR. RICHARDS: A note on obviousness. As a practical
matter, I prosecuted applications before the U.S., European, and
Japanese patent offices, and I don’t find any glaring lack of rigor
from the examiners I deal with in the U.S. Patent Office when
raising issues of obviousness. They seem to raise very similar
issues to the Europeans and the Japanese, so we seem to effectively
have a sort of worldwide standard on obviousness at the moment.
I wonder whether it is in anybody’s interest for the United States to
take a different view from the rest of the world.
MR. RICHARDS: David, do you want to say anything?
MR. BALTO: I think the important question is establishing this
balance. It is important to recognize that protecting intellectual
property rights to create an incentive to innovate is the primary
246
247
248
249

See NAS REPORT, supra note 73, at ch. 4, pp. 87, 91.
See id.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at Executive Summary, 9–11.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at Executive Summary, 10–12 .
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concern. But when a process starts to morph into people seeking
out regulatory rights to engage in bargaining, that balance is
broken. That is what I think the FTC’s report suggests. I think
their suggestions are modest and appropriate.
And don’t bet on the Federal Circuit not accepting the FTC’s
point of view. The FTC has a very effective amicus program in
which they are often successful in convincing the appellate courts
of the appropriate interpretation of both IP and antitrust law.250
In fact, the linchpin to the Bristol-Myers case,251 where there
were millions of dollars of consumer harm for every day that
Bristol-Myers improperly extended its patentfor those people
who think that there might not be some harm from the misuse of
patentsthe key to the Bristol-Meyers case being successfully
litigated, was an amicus brief filed by the Federal Trade
Commission before the district court.252 So I wouldn’t place any
bets whatsoever that the FTC is going to be ineffective in
convincing the Federal Circuit.
MR. RICHARDS: I want to thank everybody.
MR. BYE: One final word?
MR. RICHARDS: One final word.
MR. BYE: Just one quick final remark. I want to thank you all
for listening today. I would encourage everyone to take the NSF
report and take the FTC report and compare the two
recommendations with respect to obviousness.253 You will see that
we recommend that there should be no change in the statutory
standard. We think the standard is good as it exists.
We do believe that, in certain contexts, the test has not been
applied as well as it could, which is quite similar to what the

250

See generally R. Ted Cruz, Remarks before the Antitrust Section American Bar
Association (Dec. 12, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/tcamicus.
251
In re Buspirone Patent and Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
252
Brief of Amici Curiae The Federal Trade Commission, In re Buspirone Patent and
Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 1410), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/briefs/buspirone.pdf (last visited May 9, 2005).
253
Compare NAS REPORT, supra note 73, at 87–95 with FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at
ch. 4, pp. 4–19.
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National Academies say. But I would just encourage you to go
and compare them yourselves.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you to all of you for your interesting
contributions, and thank you to the panel. We are now adjourned.
MS. SYBBLIS: I’d like to thank our moderator and our
panelists for their participation today and their insightful comments
on this dynamic area.
We are now going to take a ten-minute coffee break. There are
refreshments in the Atrium. Then we will return here for our
second panel.
Thank you.

